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January 20, 2015  
 
 
Before:  RENDELL, SMITH and KRAUSE, Circuit Judges 
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O P I N I O N* 
   
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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RENDELL, Circuit Judge: 
 
 Appellant Jamar Fisher appeals his 96-month sentence, which was imposed when 
he pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute drugs.  We will affirm.   
I. Background 
 Fisher was arrested for and pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute 
drugs.  In ultimately sentencing him, the District Court determined he was not a career-
offender but determined that an “upward variance” was warranted based on the 
appropriate 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors.  Although the Guidelines range was 30 to 37 
months, Fisher was sentenced to a term of 96 months due to his criminal history and 
likelihood of recidivism.  Fisher now appeals his sentencing, arguing it was procedurally 
and substantively defective.   
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Regardless of whether the sentence imposed is 
within the federal Sentencing Guidelines range, “the appellate court must review the 
sentence under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”  Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 
(2007).  First, we must “ensure that the district court committed no significant procedural 
error.”  Id.  Next, we consider “the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed 
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.”  Id.  If the sentence is outside the Guidelines 
range, we will give some deference to the district court’s decision that the § 3553(a) 
factors justify the variance.  Id.  
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III.  Discussion 
 Fisher first argues that his sentence was procedurally defective because the 
District Court wrongly termed its action an upward “variance,” when it was actually a 
departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3 because his criminal history category under-reported 
the seriousness of his criminal history.  Thus, he urges that the District Court’s alleged 
“upward departure” was imposed without the appropriate written opinion.  In the 
alternative, he asks that his sentence be vacated based on the District Court’s lack of 
clarity.   
 In sentencing a defendant, a District Court must exercise its discretion by 
considering the relevant § 3553(a) factors regardless of whether the sentence varies from 
the Guidelines.  United States v. Gunter, 462 F.3d 237, 247 (3d Cir. 2006).  Departures 
require a motion, United States v. Brown, 578 F.3d 221, 225-26 (3d Cir. 2009), since the 
court must give parties reasonable notice of a sentencing departure, Irizarry v. United 
States, 553 U.S. 708, 709-10 (2008).  Variances, on the other hand, are “discretionary 
changes to a guidelines sentencing range based on a judge’s review of all the § 3553(a) 
factors and do not require advance notice.”  Brown, 578 F.3d at 226.  
 Whether a district court has imposed a departure or a variance has consequences 
for our review.  Id.  When reviewing a variance, we evaluate the district court’s analysis 
of the § 3553(a) factors; when reviewing a departure, we must consult the relevant 
Guidelines provision in order to determine whether the departure was appropriate.  Id.  
Since departures require motions, and no formal motions requesting an upward departure 
were filed here, the only procedurally valid method the District Court could have used in 
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increasing Fisher’s sentence was through an upward variance.  Thus, the threshold 
question is whether the District Court imposed an upward variance or improperly 
imposed an upward departure.  
 While Fisher points out that the District Court did initially state in a memorandum 
opinion that an “upward departure” was warranted, the District Court clearly misspoke 
and, at a hearing soon thereafter, specifically stated, “I think I am contemplating an 
upward variance . . . . I am aware that my memorandum had said departure.”  (App. 53.)  
Furthermore, at the March 10, 2014 sentencing hearing, the District Court stated, “there 
was a motion for a downward departure which has been withdrawn in light of the court’s 
finding . . . and we are now at the stage of the consideration by this court of the § 3553(a) 
factors.”  (Id. at 115-16.)  The “stage” at which a court evaluates § 3553(a) factors is 
when it considers an upward variance.  Brown, 578 F.3d at 225-26.  Finally, before 
analyzing the § 3553(a) factors, the District Court stated that “it appeared to the court that 
an upward variance was warranted.”  (App. 137.)  Thus, the District Court clearly 
intended to apply a variance despite its mistake in its initial opinion, and Fisher was well 
aware of the correction and the District Court’s intended action.1  
 As we conclude that there was no procedural error, we next consider whether the 
sentencing was substantively defective.  Substantive defects are reviewed for abuse of 
discretion, granting high deference to the District Court’s findings.  Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.  
                                              
1  In finding that the District Court appropriately applied an upward variance, we need not 
consider Fisher’s other two claims regarding the procedural inadequacies of the alleged 
“upward departure” and his alternative argument, which asks us to vacate his sentence if 
we cannot discern whether a variance or departure was granted. 
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Fisher first contends that the District Court did not consider all of the relevant sentencing 
factors, instead placing too much weight on his likelihood of recidivism and criminal 
history.  The § 3553(a) factors explicitly look at “the history . . . of the defendant” as well 
as the likelihood of “further crimes of the defendant.”  18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(C).  
Specifically, recidivism is the most traditional basis for an increase in a defendant’s 
sentencing.  Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 245 (1998).  The District 
Court did rely on Fisher’s high rate of recidivism and his past crimes in determining his 
sentence but not to the exclusion of other factors, including “respect for the law,” 
“deterrence,” “education or vocational training,” and “protecting the public from further 
crimes.”  (App. 141-43.)  Furthermore, when asked whether any factors were not 
addressed in his sentencing, Fisher replied in the negative.  (Id. at 143.)  Thus, the 
District Court appropriately considered all of the relevant sentencing factors.   
 Fisher next claims that the District Court failed to adequately explain the chosen 
sentence.  A sentencing court has an obligation to explain why the variance is appropriate 
in light of the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and the meritorious objections of the parties.  
See United States v. Negroni, 638 F.3d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. 
Kononchuk, 485 F.3d 199, 204 (3d Cir. 2007).  Here, almost seven pages of the record is 
devoted to the District Court’s reasoning as to why Fisher’s criminal history and the 
ineffectiveness of his previous probation and imprisonment warrant a longer sentence.  
(App. 137-43.)  Thus, the District Court appropriately explained Fisher’s chosen 
sentence.    
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 Fisher finally claims that the District Court erroneously relied on his criminal 
history in imposing an upward variance since the Guidelines already account for his 
criminal history.  While a criminal history category attempts to classify the history of the 
defendant as compared to others for baseline purposes, it does not do away with the 
court’s obligation to take the nature and extent of that history into account in determining 
the appropriate sentence.  Indeed, § 3553(a) requires the court to consider criminal 
history and recidivism.  In imposing a sentence above the advisory guidelines range, an 
upward variance is based on the consideration of these same § 3553(a) factors.  United 
States v. Ausburn, 502 F.3d 313, 325 (3d Cir. 2007).  Thus, the § 3553(a) factors, which 
include the defendant’s criminal history, are considered when imposing the Guidelines 
range, as stated above, and when imposing an upward variance.  As such, the District 
Court appropriately considered the defendant’s criminal history when imposing the 
upward variance. 
IV.  Conclusion 
 Because the District Court appropriately applied an upward variance, we will 
affirm the sentencing of the District Court. 
